RSA has unveiled Agent ID, a platform intended to discover, secure and govern AI agents across cloud, on-premises and air-gapped environments. The product treats agents as identities that need named owners, risk tiers, lifecycle states and enforceable permissions rather than as ordinary software processes.

Its three modules cover discovery, action control and governance. RSA says Agent ID Discover can find sanctioned and unsanctioned agents and Model Context Protocol servers; Secure checks calls through an AI/MCP gateway; and Govern applies certification, access reviews and lifecycle controls. Customers can designate actions such as wire transfers or access to sensitive records as requiring authenticated human approval.

That is particularly relevant to financial institutions because agent permissions are becoming a new form of privileged access. Traditional identity and access management was built around people, applications and service accounts. An autonomous agent can combine credentials, tools and delegated authority in ways that make ownership and evidence harder to establish.

RSA's availability claims and framework mappings are vendor statements and will require customer validation. Even so, the architecture points towards a practical control model: discover every agent, bind it to a responsible human, constrain each tool call and preserve an audit trail.

Execution Level Governance- What audit-ready agent governance actually looks like
David Girvin, founder and CEO of Assury argues that model-in-the-loop review, AI governing AI, is fundamentally unreliable for regulated environments: even the best-performing models miss a meaningful share of violations, the reviewing model is typically provided by the same vendor being reviewed, and prompt injection or context poisoning can compromise both the acting agent and its supposed overseer simultaneously. He makes the case for deterministic, architecturally enforced controls instead, walking through Assury’s approach of autonomy zones, session risk accumulation, and credential starvation, which lets a compromised agent be cut off from its tools instantly rather than relying on time-boxed access. The conversation touches on why David is sceptical of just-in-time credentialing as a solution for agent security more broadly, since agent sessions don’t run on predictable human timescales, along with the current gap between how identity and security vendors are pitching agent protection and what he sees happening at the execution layer in practice. He also discusses the compliance and audit implications of probabilistic decision-making, arguing that regulated industries will increasingly need tamper-evident, hash-chained audit trails that can withstand scrutiny from auditors and regulators who are only beginning to understand agentic risk, and reflects on a named frontier lab’s own published framework as an example of the gap between research and practitioner reality. Elsewhere, David reflects candidly on building a bootstrapped security company in an increasingly crowded market, why he turned down aggressive VC funding to stay in control of the product, and what a credible third-party assessment of his own gateway would need to look like given that Assury sits directly in the execution path for every customer’s agents.
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