Early Warning has warned that deepfake-enabled corporate fraud can exploit a blind spot across several banking relationships. The company highlights vendor impersonation, where criminals use convincing communications to change payment instructions and redirect funds.

The important point is operational. A finance team may hold accounts with several banks, use different approval processes and rely on email, voice or video cues that are no longer reliable proof of identity. Even a strong control at one bank can be undermined if another channel accepts a beneficiary change or urgent transfer with weaker verification.

Enterprises should therefore treat deepfakes as part of payment-control design, not as a media-authenticity problem alone. Effective defences include independent call-backs to established contact details, dual approval for beneficiary changes, cooling-off periods, transaction analytics, device and behavioural signals, and rapid information sharing when an impersonation attempt is detected.

Banks also need a common incident view. If suspicious instructions move across institutions, fragmented evidence can delay intervention. The strongest webinar case would bring together a treasury practitioner, a bank fraud operator and an identity specialist to explain which controls work before a payment leaves the account.

Execution Level Governance- What audit-ready agent governance actually looks like
David Girvin, founder and CEO of Assury argues that model-in-the-loop review, AI governing AI, is fundamentally unreliable for regulated environments: even the best-performing models miss a meaningful share of violations, the reviewing model is typically provided by the same vendor being reviewed, and prompt injection or context poisoning can compromise both the acting agent and its supposed overseer simultaneously. He makes the case for deterministic, architecturally enforced controls instead, walking through Assury’s approach of autonomy zones, session risk accumulation, and credential starvation, which lets a compromised agent be cut off from its tools instantly rather than relying on time-boxed access. The conversation touches on why David is sceptical of just-in-time credentialing as a solution for agent security more broadly, since agent sessions don’t run on predictable human timescales, along with the current gap between how identity and security vendors are pitching agent protection and what he sees happening at the execution layer in practice. He also discusses the compliance and audit implications of probabilistic decision-making, arguing that regulated industries will increasingly need tamper-evident, hash-chained audit trails that can withstand scrutiny from auditors and regulators who are only beginning to understand agentic risk, and reflects on a named frontier lab’s own published framework as an example of the gap between research and practitioner reality. Elsewhere, David reflects candidly on building a bootstrapped security company in an increasingly crowded market, why he turned down aggressive VC funding to stay in control of the product, and what a credible third-party assessment of his own gateway would need to look like given that Assury sits directly in the execution path for every customer’s agents.
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