A cyber breach at EY exposed information connected to clients of Goldman Sachs’ wealth business, Man Group and property group Tishman Speyer, the Financial Times reported. The incident involved a third-party IT service-management platform and a vulnerability in Checkmarx software, rather than a compromise of the financial firms’ own systems.

The affected data included names, addresses, tax identifiers, email addresses and financial information. According to the report, unauthorised access occurred between 28 March and 12 April. EY said its broader enterprise systems were not affected and that its investigation was in its final stages. Goldman Sachs and Man Group said their systems were not compromised and client assets remained safe.

The episode is a useful reminder that “our systems were not breached” is not the same as “our customers’ data was not exposed”. Professional-services firms, software providers and outsourced operations can hold information that is just as sensitive as data inside a bank or asset manager.

For regulated organisations, supplier reviews should therefore cover sub-processors, vulnerability disclosure, incident-notification speed, evidence of remediation and the exact data each provider can access. Contractual assurance alone is weak if it cannot be matched to a live dependency map and tested response plan.

Execution Level Governance- What audit-ready agent governance actually looks like
David Girvin, founder and CEO of Assury argues that model-in-the-loop review, AI governing AI, is fundamentally unreliable for regulated environments: even the best-performing models miss a meaningful share of violations, the reviewing model is typically provided by the same vendor being reviewed, and prompt injection or context poisoning can compromise both the acting agent and its supposed overseer simultaneously. He makes the case for deterministic, architecturally enforced controls instead, walking through Assury’s approach of autonomy zones, session risk accumulation, and credential starvation, which lets a compromised agent be cut off from its tools instantly rather than relying on time-boxed access. The conversation touches on why David is sceptical of just-in-time credentialing as a solution for agent security more broadly, since agent sessions don’t run on predictable human timescales, along with the current gap between how identity and security vendors are pitching agent protection and what he sees happening at the execution layer in practice. He also discusses the compliance and audit implications of probabilistic decision-making, arguing that regulated industries will increasingly need tamper-evident, hash-chained audit trails that can withstand scrutiny from auditors and regulators who are only beginning to understand agentic risk, and reflects on a named frontier lab’s own published framework as an example of the gap between research and practitioner reality. Elsewhere, David reflects candidly on building a bootstrapped security company in an increasingly crowded market, why he turned down aggressive VC funding to stay in control of the product, and what a credible third-party assessment of his own gateway would need to look like given that Assury sits directly in the execution path for every customer’s agents.
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