The Information Commissioner's Office is approaching the 20 November deadline for its call for evidence on agentic AI. The regulator opened the exercise on 8 October to understand how data protection law should apply to systems that can plan, use tools and act across multiple steps rather than simply generate a response.

The questions span data security, transparency, accountability, automated decision making, fairness, purpose limitation and lawful processing. That breadth is important. An agent may touch personal data at several points: deciding what to retrieve, combining records, choosing a tool, taking an action and preserving a trace of the result. A conventional privacy notice or model card may not explain those changing data flows or who is accountable when an action crosses systems.

The call is not final guidance and should not be treated as a new compliance rule. It is an opportunity for practitioners to submit evidence about real operating patterns, failure modes and controls. Useful responses should distinguish recommendation from execution, show where human approval is meaningful, and explain how organisations limit purpose, permissions and retention while still maintaining an auditable record.


Execution Level Governance- What audit-ready agent governance actually looks like
David Girvin, founder and CEO of Assury argues that model-in-the-loop review, AI governing AI, is fundamentally unreliable for regulated environments: even the best-performing models miss a meaningful share of violations, the reviewing model is typically provided by the same vendor being reviewed, and prompt injection or context poisoning can compromise both the acting agent and its supposed overseer simultaneously. He makes the case for deterministic, architecturally enforced controls instead, walking through Assury's approach of autonomy zones, session risk accumulation, and credential starvation, which lets a compromised agent be cut off from its tools instantly rather than relying on time-boxed access. The conversation touches on why David is sceptical of just-in-time credentialing as a solution for agent security more broadly, since agent sessions don't run on predictable human timescales, along with the current gap between how identity and security vendors are pitching agent protection and what he sees happening at the execution layer in practice. He also discusses the compliance and audit implications of probabilistic decision-making, arguing that regulated industries will increasingly need tamper-evident, hash-chained audit trails that can withstand scrutiny from auditors and regulators who are only beginning to understand agentic risk, and reflects on a named frontier lab's own published framework as an example of the gap between research and practitioner reality. Elsewhere, David reflects candidly on building a bootstrapped security company in an increasingly crowded market, why he turned down aggressive VC funding to stay in control of the product, and what a credible third-party assessment of his own gateway would need to look like given that Assury sits directly in the execution path for every customer's agents.
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