NVIDIA's board has established a standing National Security and Export Control Oversight Committee. The company says the committee will oversee national-security policies, export-control compliance and global trade risk, with its National Security and Global Trade Compliance teams reporting directly to the committee and to interim chief executive Colette Kress for day-to-day operations.

Director Suzanne Nora Johnson will chair the group, joined by Stephen C. Neal and John O. Dabiri. NVIDIA says it will meet at least quarterly, including in executive session, and retain outside legal, national-security and trade specialists. The structure places an increasingly consequential operational risk alongside the board's other formal oversight duties rather than leaving it solely with management compliance functions.

The announcement does not describe a new export policy, a government settlement or evidence of a compliance failure. Its significance lies in governance. Advanced chips now sit at the intersection of commercial growth, national-security policy and fast-changing trade restrictions. Boards in other infrastructure businesses may face the same question: whether geopolitical and export exposure is sufficiently material and specialised to require a dedicated committee, explicit escalation routes and independent expertise.


Execution Level Governance- What audit-ready agent governance actually looks like
David Girvin, founder and CEO of Assury argues that model-in-the-loop review, AI governing AI, is fundamentally unreliable for regulated environments: even the best-performing models miss a meaningful share of violations, the reviewing model is typically provided by the same vendor being reviewed, and prompt injection or context poisoning can compromise both the acting agent and its supposed overseer simultaneously. He makes the case for deterministic, architecturally enforced controls instead, walking through Assury's approach of autonomy zones, session risk accumulation, and credential starvation, which lets a compromised agent be cut off from its tools instantly rather than relying on time-boxed access. The conversation touches on why David is sceptical of just-in-time credentialing as a solution for agent security more broadly, since agent sessions don't run on predictable human timescales, along with the current gap between how identity and security vendors are pitching agent protection and what he sees happening at the execution layer in practice. He also discusses the compliance and audit implications of probabilistic decision-making, arguing that regulated industries will increasingly need tamper-evident, hash-chained audit trails that can withstand scrutiny from auditors and regulators who are only beginning to understand agentic risk, and reflects on a named frontier lab's own published framework as an example of the gap between research and practitioner reality. Elsewhere, David reflects candidly on building a bootstrapped security company in an increasingly crowded market, why he turned down aggressive VC funding to stay in control of the product, and what a credible third-party assessment of his own gateway would need to look like given that Assury sits directly in the execution path for every customer's agents.
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