OpenAI says it is working with NATO's Communications and Information Agency to give NATO institutions access to advanced cybersecurity models through Daybreak. According to the company, NATO has used up to 300 billion raw input and output tokens in a month, and the 2026 Crossed Swords exercise included a stream in which participants built and evaluated agents for cyber operations with human oversight.

The company also describes work with Ukraine's Ministry of Digital Transformation, ENISA and national cyber agencies. It says ENISA used frontier models in a review of 27 software projects and that maintainers confirmed 95% of 88 potential issues assessed across the models tested. CERT Polska, meanwhile, is reported to have used OpenAI models in work that identified six RouterOS vulnerabilities subsequently fixed by MikroTik. Those outcomes are attributed to OpenAI and its linked partners; they should not be treated as a general accuracy rate for AI vulnerability research.

The scale of use makes governance more important than the headline capability. Authorised access, scope control, human validation, disclosure coordination and cost measurement all become operational requirements. NATO's own procurement and oversight experience could therefore be as valuable to enterprise defenders as the vulnerability findings themselves.


Execution Level Governance- What audit-ready agent governance actually looks like
David Girvin, founder and CEO of Assury argues that model-in-the-loop review, AI governing AI, is fundamentally unreliable for regulated environments: even the best-performing models miss a meaningful share of violations, the reviewing model is typically provided by the same vendor being reviewed, and prompt injection or context poisoning can compromise both the acting agent and its supposed overseer simultaneously. He makes the case for deterministic, architecturally enforced controls instead, walking through Assury's approach of autonomy zones, session risk accumulation, and credential starvation, which lets a compromised agent be cut off from its tools instantly rather than relying on time-boxed access. The conversation touches on why David is sceptical of just-in-time credentialing as a solution for agent security more broadly, since agent sessions don't run on predictable human timescales, along with the current gap between how identity and security vendors are pitching agent protection and what he sees happening at the execution layer in practice. He also discusses the compliance and audit implications of probabilistic decision-making, arguing that regulated industries will increasingly need tamper-evident, hash-chained audit trails that can withstand scrutiny from auditors and regulators who are only beginning to understand agentic risk, and reflects on a named frontier lab's own published framework as an example of the gap between research and practitioner reality. Elsewhere, David reflects candidly on building a bootstrapped security company in an increasingly crowded market, why he turned down aggressive VC funding to stay in control of the product, and what a credible third-party assessment of his own gateway would need to look like given that Assury sits directly in the execution path for every customer's agents.
Share this post
The link has been copied!