Microblink has expanded its Identity Intelligence OS with biometric, document-intelligence and fraud-detection features designed for an “agentic economy”. The company says its Fraud Lab generates more than 100,000 images each month for model training and testing.

Microblink also reports 100% deepfake detection in testing it describes as DHS-powered. That is a strong claim, but the announcement does not by itself establish performance across every attack type, capture device, demographic group or operational threshold. Buyers should request the test protocol, sample composition, false-positive rate and results against unseen attacks.

The wider product direction is more significant than one benchmark. As AI agents open accounts, submit documents or act for customers, identity assurance has to continue beyond onboarding. Organisations need to know whether the actor is a person, an authorised agent or a malicious automation, and whether the evidence remains valid as the journey moves across channels.

For financial services, continuous identity intelligence should be assessed alongside transaction risk and delegated authority. A system that detects manipulated media but cannot explain who authorised an agent or where its credentials came from leaves a material gap.


Execution Level Governance- What audit-ready agent governance actually looks like
David Girvin, founder and CEO of Assury argues that model-in-the-loop review, AI governing AI, is fundamentally unreliable for regulated environments: even the best-performing models miss a meaningful share of violations, the reviewing model is typically provided by the same vendor being reviewed, and prompt injection or context poisoning can compromise both the acting agent and its supposed overseer simultaneously. He makes the case for deterministic, architecturally enforced controls instead, walking through Assury’s approach of autonomy zones, session risk accumulation, and credential starvation, which lets a compromised agent be cut off from its tools instantly rather than relying on time-boxed access. The conversation touches on why David is sceptical of just-in-time credentialing as a solution for agent security more broadly, since agent sessions don’t run on predictable human timescales, along with the current gap between how identity and security vendors are pitching agent protection and what he sees happening at the execution layer in practice. He also discusses the compliance and audit implications of probabilistic decision-making, arguing that regulated industries will increasingly need tamper-evident, hash-chained audit trails that can withstand scrutiny from auditors and regulators who are only beginning to understand agentic risk, and reflects on a named frontier lab’s own published framework as an example of the gap between research and practitioner reality. Elsewhere, David reflects candidly on building a bootstrapped security company in an increasingly crowded market, why he turned down aggressive VC funding to stay in control of the product, and what a credible third-party assessment of his own gateway would need to look like given that Assury sits directly in the execution path for every customer’s agents.

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