Cloudflare has outlined a research design for post-quantum private authorisation called MOLE, short for Moderation of unLinkable Endorsements. The aim is to let a client prove that it received an endorsement from one of a set of trusted issuers without revealing which issuer was involved. Cloudflare sees the approach as relevant to moderating automated and agentic traffic without forcing every interaction into an identity-revealing account model.

The work starts from a limitation in Privacy Pass. Its tokens protect the link between issuance and redemption, but the classical cryptography can eventually be forged by a sufficiently capable quantum computer. Moving to post-quantum primitives creates a size problem: Cloudflare notes that an ML-DSA-44 signature is 2,420 bytes compared with 64 bytes for ECDSA-P256. Its proposed VOLE-based endorsement and credential schemes remain research candidates, with costs and security proofs still under development.

Cloudflare reports estimated presentation sizes of 6.5KB for VOLE-IHAT endorsements and 12KB for VOLE-ACT credentials, with operations taking a few milliseconds in its implementation. Those are preliminary engineering estimates, not a deployed standard. The practical takeaway is that post-quantum migration extends beyond TLS. Anonymous credentials, rate limiting and agent authorisation also depend on cryptography that organisations will eventually need to replace without sacrificing privacy or performance.

Execution Level Governance- What audit-ready agent governance actually looks like
David Girvin, founder and CEO of Assury argues that model-in-the-loop review, AI governing AI, is fundamentally unreliable for regulated environments: even the best-performing models miss a meaningful share of violations, the reviewing model is typically provided by the same vendor being reviewed, and prompt injection or context poisoning can compromise both the acting agent and its supposed overseer simultaneously. He makes the case for deterministic, architecturally enforced controls instead, walking through Assury's approach of autonomy zones, session risk accumulation, and credential starvation, which lets a compromised agent be cut off from its tools instantly rather than relying on time-boxed access. The conversation touches on why David is sceptical of just-in-time credentialing as a solution for agent security more broadly, since agent sessions don't run on predictable human timescales, along with the current gap between how identity and security vendors are pitching agent protection and what he sees happening at the execution layer in practice. He also discusses the compliance and audit implications of probabilistic decision-making, arguing that regulated industries will increasingly need tamper-evident, hash-chained audit trails that can withstand scrutiny from auditors and regulators who are only beginning to understand agentic risk, and reflects on a named frontier lab's own published framework as an example of the gap between research and practitioner reality. Elsewhere, David reflects candidly on building a bootstrapped security company in an increasingly crowded market, why he turned down aggressive VC funding to stay in control of the product, and what a credible third-party assessment of his own gateway would need to look like given that Assury sits directly in the execution path for every customer's agents.
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