Post-quantum cryptography is beginning to move from standards documents into production internet infrastructure. Cloudflare has enabled validation of ML-DSA-44 post-quantum signatures for DNSSEC on its 1.1.1.1 public DNS resolver, providing a useful example of what migration looks like when new cryptography meets real networks.
The change matters because quantum risk is often discussed as a distant problem. NIST now says its three completed post-quantum cryptography standards are ready for implementation, and organisations are being encouraged to begin migration work rather than wait for a cryptographically relevant quantum computer to arrive.
Cloudflare’s DNSSEC work also illustrates why migration is not simply a matter of replacing one algorithm with another. An ML-DSA-44 signature is much larger than the ECDSA P-256 signatures widely used today. Cloudflare cites 2,420 bytes for ML-DSA-44 compared with 64 bytes for ECDSA P-256. Larger signatures affect packet size, transport behaviour, compatibility and the risk of fallback or downgrade problems.

DNSSEC is an important example because it highlights a different quantum threat from the familiar 'harvest now, decrypt later' scenario. Harvest-now attacks concern encrypted information that an adversary records today in the hope of decrypting it in the future. DNSSEC is primarily about authenticity rather than secrecy. The concern is that sufficiently powerful quantum systems could eventually undermine the signatures used to prove that DNS records are genuine, creating a forgery risk rather than a retrospective decryption risk.
That distinction should shape enterprise migration programmes. Organisations need to map where cryptography is used for confidentiality, where it is used for signatures, and where it underpins certificates, identity, machine-to-machine trust and network protocols. They also need to understand which suppliers and legacy systems can support hybrid or post-quantum approaches and which cannot.
NIST’s work on Personal Identity Verification is a further sign that transition will be gradual. Its June 2026 materials are initial working drafts, not final PIV standards, and centre on a dual-stack model in which existing classical PIV keys and data objects coexist with new post-quantum credentials to support backward compatibility and incremental deployment.
The practical lesson is that post-quantum readiness is increasingly a systems engineering and inventory problem. The organisations that can identify their cryptographic dependencies, test new algorithms and manage compatibility are likely to be better placed than those treating quantum risk as a future procurement decision.
