Apple plans to add controls to the Full Disk Access permission in macOS, citing the growing risks from capable, autonomous AI agents. Its developer announcement on 2 October says granting that access will require very explicit user action. It does not give an implementation timetable.

Full Disk Access allows applications to bypass protections around private data. Apple says some developers are using it in ways that expose files, email, messages and browsing history without users fully understanding the consequences. Communication applications can also affect the privacy of other people in a conversation.

For enterprise IT teams, the announcement provides a reason to review which applications hold broad permissions and why. An assistant that reads a document may need a different permission boundary from an agent that searches mail, modifies files and acts repeatedly without supervision.

A useful deployment review should establish the minimum access required, who approves it and how access can be withdrawn. Security teams should also test whether users can understand the permission request before approving it. Apple's planned controls will need to be assessed once their design and availability are clear.

Execution Level Governance- What audit-ready agent governance actually looks like
David Girvin, founder and CEO of Assury argues that model-in-the-loop review, AI governing AI, is fundamentally unreliable for regulated environments: even the best-performing models miss a meaningful share of violations, the reviewing model is typically provided by the same vendor being reviewed, and prompt injection or context poisoning can compromise both the acting agent and its supposed overseer simultaneously. He makes the case for deterministic, architecturally enforced controls instead, walking through Assury’s approach of autonomy zones, session risk accumulation, and credential starvation, which lets a compromised agent be cut off from its tools instantly rather than relying on time-boxed access. The conversation touches on why David is sceptical of just-in-time credentialing as a solution for agent security more broadly, since agent sessions don’t run on predictable human timescales, along with the current gap between how identity and security vendors are pitching agent protection and what he sees happening at the execution layer in practice. He also discusses the compliance and audit implications of probabilistic decision-making, arguing that regulated industries will increasingly need tamper-evident, hash-chained audit trails that can withstand scrutiny from auditors and regulators who are only beginning to understand agentic risk, and reflects on a named frontier lab’s own published framework as an example of the gap between research and practitioner reality. Elsewhere, David reflects candidly on building a bootstrapped security company in an increasingly crowded market, why he turned down aggressive VC funding to stay in control of the product, and what a credible third-party assessment of his own gateway would need to look like given that Assury sits directly in the execution path for every customer’s agents.
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