The UK government has opened a consultation on reforming the whistleblowing framework, including a proposed Serious Fraud Office scheme to reward people who provide significant original information about economic crime. Under the proposal, eligibility would depend on the information contributing to a conviction or other enforcement action.

The consultation is not a final scheme, and design questions remain. These include how rewards would be calculated, how duplicate or low-quality claims would be handled, and how people would be protected from retaliation. The proposal nevertheless signals a more intelligence-led approach to fraud and bribery enforcement.

AI may help investigators classify, link and prioritise a larger volume of reports, but it should not become an opaque credibility filter. Systems used for triage need strong provenance, access controls and human review, particularly when allegations concern named people or commercially sensitive conduct. False positives, manipulated evidence and synthetic documents create additional risk.

For regulated firms, the immediate task is internal. Compliance teams should test whether staff can report concerns safely, whether evidence is preserved in a defensible form and whether investigations remain independent. A reward programme may increase external reporting, making trusted internal channels and timely escalation even more important.

Execution Level Governance- What audit-ready agent governance actually looks like
David Girvin, founder and CEO of Assury argues that model-in-the-loop review, AI governing AI, is fundamentally unreliable for regulated environments: even the best-performing models miss a meaningful share of violations, the reviewing model is typically provided by the same vendor being reviewed, and prompt injection or context poisoning can compromise both the acting agent and its supposed overseer simultaneously. He makes the case for deterministic, architecturally enforced controls instead, walking through Assury's approach of autonomy zones, session risk accumulation, and credential starvation, which lets a compromised agent be cut off from its tools instantly rather than relying on time-boxed access. The conversation touches on why David is sceptical of just-in-time credentialing as a solution for agent security more broadly, since agent sessions don't run on predictable human timescales, along with the current gap between how identity and security vendors are pitching agent protection and what he sees happening at the execution layer in practice. He also discusses the compliance and audit implications of probabilistic decision-making, arguing that regulated industries will increasingly need tamper-evident, hash-chained audit trails that can withstand scrutiny from auditors and regulators who are only beginning to understand agentic risk, and reflects on a named frontier lab's own published framework as an example of the gap between research and practitioner reality. Elsewhere, David reflects candidly on building a bootstrapped security company in an increasingly crowded market, why he turned down aggressive VC funding to stay in control of the product, and what a credible third-party assessment of his own gateway would need to look like given that Assury sits directly in the execution path for every customer's agents.
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