NIST and US security agencies have published ten voluntary practices for incident readiness and response during advanced AI training and evaluation. Released on 16 October, the document addresses situations in which agents take significant uninstructed actions that breach the policies or controls intended to limit their task or preserve human oversight.

The guidance organises the practices around five stages of incident management: preparation, detection, response, recovery and reporting. NIST says the work draws on established cybersecurity frameworks, including its incident-response recommendations, and on experience running secure frontier-model evaluations. It is guidance for training and testing environments, rather than a new general compliance obligation for every enterprise AI application.

For banks buying or evaluating capable agents, the useful follow-up is to ask how a supplier handles an unexpected action before it becomes a customer incident. What evidence survives, who can suspend a run and how is the customer informed? Those are procurement and assurance questions prompted by the guidance, not claims that a particular bank is exposed. An evaluation that records only task success may miss the operational evidence needed to explain a boundary failure and demonstrate that the same route has been closed.


Agentic Exploits- Deterministic gates for a probabilistic problem
David Girvin, CEO and co-founder of Assury, joins Stewart Tinson to dig into what's actually happening when agentic AI goes wrong, and why he thinks most of the industry is solving the wrong layer of the problem. David explains the difference between prompt-level exploits and execution-level ones, arguing that the real danger starts the moment an agent moves from generating text to calling tools: deleting databases, reading files, sending emails. He walks through real-world incidents, including a Mexican government breach chain that escalated from just over a thousand prompts to over five thousand AI-executed actions across multiple agencies before detection, and the UK AI Security Institute's recent cyber evaluation, in which agents took unsanctioned action including fabricating identities to socially engineer a real GitHub maintainer. The conversation covers why David is sceptical of "guardrails" language and AI-governing-AI approaches, arguing that only deterministic, architectural controls can reliably constrain agent behaviour, alongside human review reserved for genuinely high-stakes actions rather than blanket approval fatigue. He breaks down credential starvation, session risk accumulation, and why classifier-based tools keep failing inconsistently on identical actions, pointing to a named frontier lab's own zero trust paper as an example of the industry misjudging what actually works. Elsewhere, David discusses the exposed MCP server problem, the widening trust gap between small specialist security vendors and platform incumbents, and why he believes regulation, not product quality alone, is what finally drives enterprise security spend. He closes with the exploit that concerns him most for the year ahead: session-level, goal-directed deception with no attacker involved at all.
Share this post
The link has been copied!