Microsoft is warning chief information security officers to prepare for a sustained increase in vulnerability findings as frontier models become part of routine code scanning. In a new security blog, the company said September 2026 produced a record number of security updates, close to 1,000, and told customers to expect elevated Patch Tuesday volumes for on-premises software.

The company argues that discovery speed is no longer the only constraint. Security teams must validate findings, determine severity, test patches and protect critical services at a scale for which manual review processes were not designed. Microsoft said it uses a harness layer to control how models access code, validate outputs and connect findings to triage and remediation workflows. One such harness, codenamed MDASH, is now available to customers.

Microsoft also recommended its Baseline Security Mode, which is available to existing customers within their current licence agreements. These are vendor recommendations and the record update count is Microsoft's own figure, rather than an independently audited measure of unique exploitable flaws.

The practical implication is nevertheless clear: AI can expand the vulnerability queue faster than organisations expand patching capacity. CISOs will need stronger asset inventories, exposure-based prioritisation and compensating controls so that a larger flow of findings does not become a larger backlog of unmanaged risk.


Execution Level Governance- What audit-ready agent governance actually looks like
David Girvin, founder and CEO of Assury argues that model-in-the-loop review, AI governing AI, is fundamentally unreliable for regulated environments: even the best-performing models miss a meaningful share of violations, the reviewing model is typically provided by the same vendor being reviewed, and prompt injection or context poisoning can compromise both the acting agent and its supposed overseer simultaneously. He makes the case for deterministic, architecturally enforced controls instead, walking through Assury’s approach of autonomy zones, session risk accumulation, and credential starvation, which lets a compromised agent be cut off from its tools instantly rather than relying on time-boxed access. The conversation touches on why David is sceptical of just-in-time credentialing as a solution for agent security more broadly, since agent sessions don’t run on predictable human timescales, along with the current gap between how identity and security vendors are pitching agent protection and what he sees happening at the execution layer in practice. He also discusses the compliance and audit implications of probabilistic decision-making, arguing that regulated industries will increasingly need tamper-evident, hash-chained audit trails that can withstand scrutiny from auditors and regulators who are only beginning to understand agentic risk, and reflects on a named frontier lab’s own published framework as an example of the gap between research and practitioner reality. Elsewhere, David reflects candidly on building a bootstrapped security company in an increasingly crowded market, why he turned down aggressive VC funding to stay in control of the product, and what a credible third-party assessment of his own gateway would need to look like given that Assury sits directly in the execution path for every customer’s agents.
Share this post
The link has been copied!