AvePoint’s October product updates extend its AgentPulse governance capabilities across AI environments associated with Microsoft, Google, Amazon and Anthropic. The company says the service can help organisations discover agents, identify ownership, review access and usage, and remediate risky configurations. It has also added backup support for Microsoft Copilot Studio agents and related content controls.

The announcement is vendor material, so performance and coverage should be validated in the customer’s own environment. The underlying control problem is real, however. An organisation cannot govern agents it has not inventoried, and it cannot recover a business process if prompts, configurations, knowledge sources and permissions are not included in backup and restoration plans.

Traditional model-risk registers often stop at the application boundary. Agentic systems cross that boundary by acting through identities, connectors and tools. Their recoverable state may be spread across a model service, orchestration layer, vector store, SaaS platform and identity provider. A backup that captures only one component can produce a restored system that is incomplete or dangerously over-permissioned.

The practical next step is to test one representative agent end to end. Teams should identify every dependency, restore it into an isolated environment, confirm that permissions remain least-privilege and compare the reconstructed audit trail with the original. Recovery evidence deserves the same governance attention as model evaluation.

Execution Level Governance- What audit-ready agent governance actually looks like
David Girvin, founder and CEO of Assury argues that model-in-the-loop review, AI governing AI, is fundamentally unreliable for regulated environments: even the best-performing models miss a meaningful share of violations, the reviewing model is typically provided by the same vendor being reviewed, and prompt injection or context poisoning can compromise both the acting agent and its supposed overseer simultaneously. He makes the case for deterministic, architecturally enforced controls instead, walking through Assury's approach of autonomy zones, session risk accumulation, and credential starvation, which lets a compromised agent be cut off from its tools instantly rather than relying on time-boxed access. The conversation touches on why David is sceptical of just-in-time credentialing as a solution for agent security more broadly, since agent sessions don't run on predictable human timescales, along with the current gap between how identity and security vendors are pitching agent protection and what he sees happening at the execution layer in practice. He also discusses the compliance and audit implications of probabilistic decision-making, arguing that regulated industries will increasingly need tamper-evident, hash-chained audit trails that can withstand scrutiny from auditors and regulators who are only beginning to understand agentic risk, and reflects on a named frontier lab's own published framework as an example of the gap between research and practitioner reality. Elsewhere, David reflects candidly on building a bootstrapped security company in an increasingly crowded market, why he turned down aggressive VC funding to stay in control of the product, and what a credible third-party assessment of his own gateway would need to look like given that Assury sits directly in the execution path for every customer's agents.
BrightTALK
Share this post
The link has been copied!